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Introduction
Many environmentalists argue that the GATT must be "greened." They
believe GATT rules are insensitive to environmental goals. Because GATT
policy favors free trade and environmental policy calls for measures that
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reserved.
27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 755 (1994)

Cornell InternationalLaw Journal

VoL 27

may restrain imports, the two perspectives sometimes clash. This article
discusses the trade-environment conflict concerning product standards
that protect an importing country's own environment.
Import restrictions for environmental purposes fall into two categories. First, countries use restrictions to counter environmental degradation occurring beyond their own borders. These are often called processmotivated restrictions because it is the production process-and not the
product itself-that degrades the environment. For example, a country
might want to block or penalize imports of computer chips made through
a process that releases ozone-depleting chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) into
the atmosphere. Alternatively, a country might want to prohibit imports
of tuna caught with nets that kill too many dolphins or animal furs from
endangered species. Proposals to levy countervailing duties against
imports allegedly "subsidized" through lax environmental standards in the
origin country provide another example.' The central problem in these
cases is extraterritoiiality: the importing country tries to impose an environmental standard on processes that occur in a foreign country, or at
least outside the importing country's jurisdiction.
Second, countries use product-motivated restrictions to prevent the
product itself from degrading the environment within the importing
country. These might be better understood as restrictions on productcaused pollution. Examples include setting exhaust emission standards for
automobiles and placing restrictions on preservatives used in foodstuffs.
This article addresses only this second category of restrictions-standards
for product-caused pollution. The term "pollution" in this context is
defined broadly to include harm to human, animal, or plant life, as well as
harm to the environment.
The dominant problem within this second category is "de facto" discrimination against imports. If a country wants to protect its internal environment from product-caused pollution-contaminated food,
unhealthful additives, emission-prone automobiles, non-recyclable beverage containers, and the like-it will generally impose the same product
standards on both domestic and imported goods. Thus, the regulation at
issue will be facially nondiscriminatory.
Nevertheless, in practice such regulations can burden imports more
than domestic output. For instance, a country could base its automobile
emission standards on the average emission level for all cars sold-an
approach that would disadvantage foreign importers selling only large, relatively fuel-inefficient luxury cars. 2 A country could even adopt a particular standard deliberately to burden imports, a practice generally called
"disguised protectionism." For example, the allowance level for a particular food additive not used by local producers but common in a foreign
1. For an argument opposing this use of countervailing duties, seeJohnJ. Barcel6
III, CountervailingAgainst EnvironmentalSubsidies, 23 CAN. Bus. L.J. 3 (1994).
2. See DANIn. C. ESTY, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT,
FuTuRE 45 (1994).
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3
competitor's product could be set at zero.
Environmentalists have argued that GAIT rules concerning productcaused pollution threaten an importing country's freedom to regulate its
own environment.4 They foresee GATT rules interfering with a country's
attempt to block or restrict imports that do not meet the importing country's internal environmental standards. The GATT Secretariat, on the
other hand, claims that countries have virtually unfettered freedom to
control their own environment and to demand that imports meet their
own environmental standards. This statement, which seems perhaps
overly optimistic even under the original GATT, would have to be qualified after the Uruguay Round agreements on product standards take
effect.
This article evaluates the extent to which the GATT rules and procedures do in fact restrict an importing country's freedom to enforce its own
environmental standards and examines whether the existing restrictions
are reasonable. Should the GATT rules and procedures in this area be
changed? If so, how? In particular, do the new Uruguay Round agreements on product standards neglect the environment, or do they reasonably accommodate potentially conflicting free trade and environmental
goals? The challenge is to develop a regime that allows member countries
maximum freedom to set their own internal environmental standards
within a framework that also protects against "disguised protectionism"
and excessive "de facto" discrimination against imports. This article
explores how well the original GATr and the newly completed Uruguay
Round agreements meet that challenge.
Part II will describe the current GATT rules concerning import
restrictions aimed at preventing product-caused pollution in the importing country. Part III will turn to the two new Uruguay Round agreements
on product standards: the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures,5 dealing with food and beverage standards, and the Agreement
on Technical Barriers to Trade, 6 covering all technical product standards
other than food and beverage standards. This part will analyze the effect

3. Another example of disguised protectionism may be the dispute between Canada and the United States involving a special tax levied by Ontario Province on aluminum beer cans. Although the tax did not involve a product standard, the United States
accused Canada of disguised protectionism. Canada claimed that the tax was for environmental purposes. It was crucial to the U.S. argument that the tax primarily affected

U.S. beer producers-most Canadian beer is sold in bottles, whereas most U.S. beer is

sold in aluminum cans, and soft drink aluminum cans were not taxed. See Keith Bradsher, CanadaBeerDisputeFlares on Eve of Trade Talks, N.Y. TimES, July 25, 1992, §1, at 35.
4. See, e.g., Nancy Dunne, FearsOver 'GATziifa the Trade Monster' FIN. TIMES, Jan.

30, 1992, § 1, at 3.

5. Agreement on the Application of Sanitaiy and Phytosanitary Measures, GAIT Doc.
MTN/FA II-A1A-4 (Dec. 15, 1993) [hereinafter S&P Agreement], in FinalAct Embodying
the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations [hereinafter Uruguay
Round], GATr Doc. MTN/FA (Dec. 15, 1993), 33 I.L.M. 9 (1994), reprintedin OFmcE OF
THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FINAL Aar EMBODYING THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND OF MULTLATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (VERSION OF 15 DECEMBER 1993) (1993).

6. Agreement on Technical Barriersto Trade, GATT Doc. MTN/FA II-A1A-6 (Dec. 15,
1993) [hereinafter TBT Agreement], in Uruguay Round, supranote 5.
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of these new agreements on an importing country's freedom to enforce its
environmental protection laws. The article discusses in detail only the
S&P Agreement, however, because it is the more restrictive of the two.
The article concludes that the Uruguay Round agreements impose
reasonable restrictions and do not seriously threaten environmental standards in importing countries. The most significant issue is whether one
should read into the S&P Agreement a cost-benefit balancing test under
which a GAfT panel could strike down a product standard because the
panel concludes that the increased benefit to the environment is not
worth the increased damage to trade. This paper argues that GATT
panels should not so construe the agreement.
I. The Original GATT (1947)
The original provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATr or 1947 GATT) 7 as adopted in 1947 impose very few restrictions
on a member's freedom to set product standards for domestic environmental protection. Because article III's nondiscrimination requirement 8
and the prohibition on quantitative restrictions contained in article XI 9
are mutually exclusive, 10 the basic obligation is simply one of nondiscrimination against imports. Had these articles imposed additive obligations as
contained in the parallel provisions of the European Union treaty,'1 the
GATr would have restricted the regulatory freedom of its members much
more. This point is perhaps best understood by looking at the European
Union approach.
A.

The Additive Nondiscrimination and Quantitative Restriction
Obligations Under European Union Law
European Union (EU) law also contains both provisions with which we are
concerned: a general nondiscrimination obligation, found in article 6 of
the EU treaty, 12 and a prohibition on all quantitative restrictions and
"measures with equivalent effect" in article 30.13 Because EU case law
defines a "measure with equivalent effect" very broadly, virtually any internal regulatory measure falls within the article 30 prohibition. The famous
7. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55
U.N.T.S. 188, reprinted in GATT, BAsIc INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS [herein-

after B.I.S.D.], 4th Supp. 1 (1969) [hereinafter GATT].
8. Id. art. III. This article requires that imported products be subject to internal
taxes and charges only to the same extent and amount as like domestic products. See
infra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
9. Id. art. XI. Article XI forbids quantitative restrictions on the importation of
goods. See infra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
10. By "mutually exclusive" I mean that as long as a product requirement or restriction passes muster under either one of these two provisions, then it will be upheld. See
infra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 12-18 and accompanying text.
12. TREATY ESTABLIrnNG THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, as amended by

Treaty of European Union (the Maastricht Treaty), art. 6, 1992 O.J. (C224) 1 [hereinaf-

ter EU TREATY].
13. Id. art. 30.
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Dassonville14 case, for example, defines a "measure with equivalent effect"
as follows: "All trading rules enacted by member-States which are capable
of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade are to be considered as measures having an effect equivalent to
5
quantitative restrictions."'
This test would include virtually any product standard as a "measure
with equivalent effect." A product standard must be applied nondiscriminatorily pursuant to article 6, but even then it still runs afoul of article 30. The tests are additive. Article 36 lists various public policy
exceptions which a member-state may claim for measures that would
otherwise be struck down under article 30.16 Through its interpretive
powers the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has also added other public
policy justifications that apply under article 30 itself.' 7 The ECJ subjects
these article 36 and article 30 justifications to scrutiny under a "rule of

reason" or "proportionality" principle that gives the Court considerable
power to strike down regulatory regimes it finds unnecessarily or excessively restrictive of trade between member-states.' 8 The important point is
that under EU law, virtually every internal regulatory standard for products must be nondiscriminatory and must also be justified under a balanc-

ing test.
B. The Mutually Exclusive Non-Discrimination (Article III) and
Quantitative Restriction (Article XI) Obligations Under the
GATT
The central GATT obligation for product standards-found in article
III-is that a member must apply the same standard to domestic and
imported products alike, without discrimination. 19 Article II1(4) requires
national treatment for imports under all internal regulation, which is of

course an obligation not to discriminate against imports. 20 Thus, most
genuine environmental legislation will easily pass muster under article III.
If an apple must not carry the residue of a dangerous pesticide, it must not
do so whether it is home-grown or imported. If beverage containers must
be recycled, they must be recycled whether filled locally or filled abroad
and imported.
In addition, GATT article XI prohibits quantitative restrictions against
14. Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837, 2 C.M.L.R1 436
(1974).
15. Id.
at 453-54.
16. The grounds listed in article 36 are: "public morality, public policy or public
security;, the protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants; the protection
of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value; or the protection of industrial and commercial property." EU TRE.ATY, supra note 12, art. 36.
17. See PETER OLIVER, FREE MOVEMENT OF GooDs INTHE EEC 167 (2d ed. 1988).
18. See id. at 166-252; LAURENCE GORMLEY, PROHIBITING REsTRICTIONS ON TRADE
EEC 123-221 (1985).
19. GATT, supra note 7, art. IIl.

wrrlN TE

20. Id.
§ 4.
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imports. 21 An outright quota on imported apples would obviously violate
article XI. But the GATT defines quantitative restrictions much more narrowly than does EU law. GATT ad article III explains that any law or regulation that applies to both an imported product and a like domestic
product and is enforced in the case of an imported product at the point of
importation "is nevertheless to be regarded as an internal... regulation
...and is accordingly subject to the provisions of article III."22 The clear
implication is that such a measure is not considered a quantitative restriction to be governed by article XI.
Several GATT panel decisions support this interpretation. 23 To the
best of this author's knowledge, no decision that treats a measure as an
internal regulation subject to article III also subjects the measure to analysis under article XI. GATT panels tend to categorize a measure initially as
subject either to article III or article XI, but not to both. One panel, for
example, distinguished between measures intended to apply to "imported
products'"-in which case it would fall under article III-and those
intended to apply to "importationr-in which case it would be governed
by article XI.24 In the famous Tuna-Dolphin decision, the panel first concluded that the U.S. measure banning importation of Mexican tuna
caught by a dolphin-destructive method was not a regulation of a product
qua product-and hence was not an internal regulation under article III.
The U.S. measure therefore fell under article XI as a quantitative
25
restriction.
The significance of mutual exclusivity, then, is that most internal environmental standards for products would easily pass muster under the 1947
GATr. Such standards would almost always apply nondiscriminatorily to
imported and domestic products alike, and would therefore satisfy the
national treatment requirement of article III. As such, they would not be
subject to further scrutiny under article XI.
Some analyses of internal product standards devote considerable
attention to the general exceptions provisions of GATT article XX. That
article permits measures, for example, "necessary to protect human,
animal or plant life or health" 26 and measures "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources." 27 Some commentators have criticized the GATT because article XX does not include "environmental
21. Id. art. XI.
22. Id. ad art. III.
23. See, e.g., Canada-Import,Distribution and Sale ofAlcoholic Drinks by CanadianProvincial Marketing Agencies, GATr Doc. L/6304 (Mar. 22, 1988), B.I.S.D., supra note 7,
35th Supp., para. 4.24 (referring to "the distinction normally made... between restrictions affecting the importation of products and restrictions affecting imported
products").
24. Canada-Administrationof the ForeignInvestment Review Act, GATT Doc. L/5504
(Feb. 7, 1984), B.I.S.D., supra note 7, 30th Supp., para. 5.14.
25. United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna: Report of the Panel, GAIT Doc.
DS21/R (Sept. 3, 1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1594, 1621, para. 5.35 (1991), and 8 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at 1288 (Aug. 28, 1991).
26. GAIT, supra note 7, art. XX(b).

27. Id. art. XX(g).
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protection" as one of the goals justifying a general exception from GATT
obligations. 28 It should be remembered, however, that as long as product
standards are applied nondiscriminatorily, there is no violation of GAT
rules to begin with, and hence no need to find an exception under article
XX. Under EU law, by contrast, virtually all internal product standards
must be justified under the exceptions in articles 36 and 30 of the EU
treaty, the EU equivalent of GATT article XX.2 9 But because the internal
regulation (article III) and quantitative restriction (article XI) obligations
under the GATT are mutually exclusive, this pattern does not arise under
GAT? law.
In some instances, product standards may be applied more harshly
(hence discriminatorily) against imported products for environmental
purposes. For example, if a form of animal disease breaks out in country
X, an importing country might subject the derivative animal products
coming from X to extra testing and heightened scrutiny. In this case the
importing country could rely on the exceptions contained in article XX to
justify its discriminatory treatment of X products.30 But in the normal
product standard case, the rules would be applied without discrimination
to domestic and imported products alike.
C.

De Facto and Disguised Discrimination

GATT article III contains language that could be read as prohibiting various forms of "de facto" or "disguised discrimination." 3 ' As mentioned earlier, regulations that are facially nondiscriminatory can nevertheless
impose serious de facto burdens on imports and can actually be designed
with the intent of hindering imports.3 2 There are no real standards in the
1947 GATT for dealing with these problems, and it seems that no GATT
panel has ever relied upon the notion of "disguised discrimination" to rule
against a member-state regulatory regime.3 3 Furthermore, nothing in the
1947 GATT deals with the proliferation of national product standards.
Proliferation alone operates as a "de facto" barrier to trade by eliminating
the efficiencies of large scale production.
In part to deal with the proliferation of standards and also to introduce rules and principles that can reduce the occasions of "de facto" or
28. See, e.g., EsTv, supranote 2, at 221-222. Article 36 of the European Union treaty
also does not mention the environment, but the European Court ofJustice has interpreted article 30 to include "environmental protection" as one of the legitimate ends of
member-state product regulation. See, e.g., Case 302/86, Commission v. Denmark,
1988 E.C.R. 4607, 1 C.M.L.R. 619 (1989).
29. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
30. SeeJoHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 206-07 (1989).
31. See GATI', supranote 7, art. III, para. 1 ("[I]nteral... regulations... should
not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic
production."). See also, John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and EnvironmentalPolicies:
Congruence or Conflict? 49 WASH. & LEE L REv. 1227, 1236-39 (1992).
32. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
33. See ALAN 0. SYKES, POLICING TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE IN INTERNATIONALLY
INTEGRATED GOODS MARKETS (forthcoming 1995 as PRODUCr STANDARDS IN INTERNATIONALLY INTEGRATED GOODS MARKETS) (manuscript ch. 4, at 10, on file with author).
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"disguised discrimination" in national regulations, the Final Act of the
GATr Uruguay Round includes two important product standards agreements-the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures (S&P Agreement) and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade (TBT Agreement). 4 These agreements will impose important new
disciplines that go beyond the basic national treatment obligation of the
1947 GATT. Thus, once the S&P and TBT agreements become operative,
a member-state product standard must not discriminate against imports,
and must comply with all S&P or TBT requirements.
H. The Uruguay Round Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement
The Uruguay Round S&P Agreement applies to product standards used to
protect human, animal, or plant life from "additives, contaminants, toxins or
disease-carrying organisms in foods, beverages or feedstuffs."35 The Uruguay
Round TBT Agreement applies to all other technical product standards
(mandatory and voluntary) not included in the S&P Agreement.3 6 Thus
the TBT Agreement is the more general of the two. The S&P Agreement
contains stricter provisions, more constraining of member-state freedom
to impose product standards. The following discussion is therefore confined to the S&P Agreement and focuses on whether its provisions seriously interfere with a member's freedom to regulate its own internal
environment. If one finds the S&P Agreement to be reasonable and not
environmentally unfriendly-as this article maintains-one can more or
7
less conclude that the same is true for the TBT Agreement.3
34. See supranotes 9-10. To be more precise, the 1979 Tokyo Round Code on Technical Barriers to Trade was the first GATT attempt to deal with the non-tariff-barrier
aspect of product standards. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 12, 1979,
31 U.S.T. 405, 1186 U.N.T.S. 276, reprinted in GATT,B.I.S.D., supra note 7, 26th Supp. 8
(1980). See also Ivan Bernier, ProductStandards and Non-Tariff Obstacles: The GATT"Code
on TechnicalBarriersto Tradein NoN-TARur BAIERS AFMR THE ToKyo ROUND 195 (John

Quinn & Philip Slayton eds., 1982). The S&P and TBT Agreements can be described
more precisely as elaborations on the provisions of the 1979 Code.
35. S&P Agreen=n supra note 5, annex A, art. 1 (emphasis added).

36. TBT Agreement, supra note 6, art. 1.
37. The discussion that follows in the text lists five disciplines contained in the S&P
Agreement. The first ("Not More Trade Restrictive Than Required") and fifth ("Based
on International Standards") have counterparts in the TBT Agreement. See id. arts. 2.2,
2.4. The second ("Based on Scientific Principles and Evidence"), third ("Based on a

Risk Assessment"), and fourth ("Arbitrary or Unjustifiable Distinctions Prohibited") disciplines have no precise counterparts in the TBT Agreement. The language in paragraph 7 of the S&P Agreement prohibiting arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination and
disguised restrictions on trade-which may constitute a sixth discipline-is found
explicitly only in the preamble to the TBT Agreement. Id. pmbl.
The one discipline in the TBT Agreement that has no strict counterpart in the S&P
Agreement seems mostly precatory. TBT Agreement article 6.1 states: "Members shall
ensure, whenever possible, that results of conformity assessment procedures in other
Members are accepted, even when those procedures differ from their own .... " Id.
art. 6.1. But this provision is qualified as follows: "provided they are satisfied that those
procedures offer an assurance of conformity with applicable technical regulations or
standards equivalent to their own procedures." Id.
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A. The S&P Agreement Disciplines
The S&P Agreement contains several procedural obligations that are not
likely to affect a member's freedom to adopt S&P standards. These obligations achieve more transparency in a member's process for adopting standards. A member must give advance notice and an opportunity for
comment before adopting a standard and must establish national "enquiry
points" through which other members may obtain relevant information
about its S&P standards and regulatory processes. 38 The agreement also
provides for reasonable procedures for inspection and approval of
39
imported products.
The S&P Agreement imposes five distinct substantive obligations that
to some extent will restrict a member's freedom to employ a product standard, four of which can be seen as an elaboration upon the requirement
that a measure not involve disguised protection or excessive de facto discrimination. The fifth involves harmonization. This article argues that
these five disciplines are reasonable and are not a serious intrusion upon a
member's freedom to regulate its own internal environment. The agreement might be construed to include a sixth discipline, however, under
40
which a measure must satisfy an incremental cost-benefit balancing test.
The article argues against construing the agreement to include this balancing test discipline.
Not More Trade Restrictive Than Required
A member must insure that its S&P measures "are not more trade restrictive than required to achieve their appropriate level of protection, taking
into account technical and economic feasibility."4 1 Note that this "leasttrade-restrictive" requirement does not constrain the level of protection of
human, animal, or plant life a member can set as its objective. The agreement is explicit in saying in the definition section that the term "appropriate level of sanitary and phytosanitary protection" is the level deemed
appropriateby the member.42
Thus, it would seem that if the United States were to set a policy of
zero risk from pesticide Z on apples, it would be entitled to ban the import
of apples containing only trace residues of pesticide Z. It is difficult to
conceive of a less-restrictive alternative measure that could fully and precisely achieve that objective.
If the U.S. purpose were to eliminate risk from pesticide Z only, a
crude ban on all pesticide residues of any kind on apples would seem
inconsistent with the least trade-restrictive requirement. For example, if
there were a technically feasible, fully reliable, and inexpensive test to
detect only pesticide Z residue on apples, the United States would presumably have to use that test instead of banning all apples with any pesticide
1.

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

S&P Agreemenm4 supranote 5, annex B, art. 2.
Id. annex C, art. 1.
See infra part II.A.6.
S&P Agreemen supra note 5, para. 21.
Id. annex A, para. 5.
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residue. Such an outcome, however, would not compromise the environ-

mental protection goal in any way.
The agreement is also careful to protect a member from being whipsawed by various proposed alternative measures that may involve only marginally less trade restriction. An explanatory footnote states that the
alternative measure must be used only if it "achieves the appropriate level
43
of protection and is significantly less restrictive to trade."

2.

Based on Scientfic Principles and Evidence

An S&P measure must also be "based on scientific principles" and must
not be maintained "without sufficient scientific evidence." 4 4 There is an
important qualification to the second proviso. If "relevant scientific evidence is insufficient," a party may still apply the S&P measure "provisionally" on the basis of "available pertinent information," but the party must
seek additional information for an "objective assessment of risk" and
review the measure "within a reasonable period of time." 45 Presumably
this means that if after 'some reasonable period of time no scientific evidence of a risk to animal or plant life or health can be found, then the
measure cannot be maintained. But in such a case, one could hardly
understand how the measure could be a genuine health or environmental
measure in the first place. Of course, there may be disputes over whether
there is pertinent scientific evidence, whether the evidence is sufficient,
and what is a reasonable period of time.
We should keep in mind, however, that the appropriate level of S&P
protection is the "level of protection deemed appropriate by the Member
establishing the [S&P measure]."46 Thus, if there were scientific evidence,
for example, that pesticide Z was dangerous to rats and scientific principles suggested even a small related risk to humans, presumably a party
wanting no risk whatsoever to humans could ban apples containing trace
amounts of pesticide Z. The sufficiency of evidence rule, therefore, takes
on much less force in the face of a rule giving the member imposing the
measure complete control over the level of protection sought.
One would also assume that the burden of proof in a case like this
would be on the exporting country challenging an S&P measure. In most
procedural systems, the challenging party bears the burden of proof. In
fact, GATT panels and GATT procedures have been less than precise on
these burden-of-proof points, and the S&P Agreement is no exception.
47
The burden-of-proof problem will be discussed more generally below,
but it would seem appropriate to note here that the burden of proof in a
case like this should rest with the country challenging another member's
S&P standard.
43. Id. para. 21 n.3 (emphasis added).
44. Id. para. 6.

45. Id. para. 22.
46. Id. annex A, para. 5.
47. See infra part II.B.
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3. Based on Risk Assessment
An S&P measure can only be adopted on the basis of a "risk assessment"
process. 48 Thus, there must be some scientific evidence of a risk to
animal, plant, or human life or health that the S&P measure is logically
designed to protect against. It is difficult to see how any good faith S&P
measure could fail to meet this test.
One difficult issue, however, is certain to arise. Under specific U.S.
legislation, referred to as the Delaney Clause, no substance can be added
to foods if the substance causes cancer in humans orin animals. 49 In Public Citizen v. Younge0 the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that
this statutory provision was intended to be strictly applied, even when the
substance, though shown to be carcinogenic to animals, was considered by
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) on the basis of a "quantitative
risk assessment" to be of extremely low risk to humans. An FDA decision
allowing use of the substance on the ground that the risk to humans was
"de minimis" was overturned by the court.51
Does this mean that the Delaney Clause will clash with the risk assessment obligation under the S&P Agreement? I believe the answer should
be no. The S&P Agreement does not require any particular kind of risk
assessment; in particular, it does not require a "quantitative risk assessment." The Delaney Clause is still based on a risk assessment because a
substance is banned only if it causes cancer in animals and, at the same
time, involves at least some risk of cancer in humans, even if the risk is very
small or "de minimis."5 2 Congress through the Delaney Clause legislation
has in effect chosen a "zero" risk level of protection against carcinogenic
agents in food. The S&P Agreement is clear that each member-state is
entitled to choose its own appropriate level of protection against S&P
53
risks.
4. Arbitrary or UnjustifiableDistinctions Prohibited
A party must "avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the levels it
considers to be appropriate in different situations, if such distinctions
48. S&P Agreement supra note 5, paras. 16-23.

49. See 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1988); 21 U.S.C. § 360b(d)(1)(I) (1988); 21
U.S.C. § 379e(b) (5) (B) (Supp. V 1993).
50. 831 F.2d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

51. Id. at 1123.
52. This statement assumes that in all Delaney Clause cases there will be a respectable scientific opinion that the agent found carcinogenic to laboratory animals also
poses some level of carcinogenic risk to humans.

53. See S&P Agreement supranote 5, annex A,para. 5. The interpretation offered in
this paragraph is essentially the same as that given by U.S. Trade Representative
Michael Kantor in a letter to Henry A. Waxman, chairman, Subcommittee on Health
and the Environment of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce. The Waxman letter concerned provisions in the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) that are the same as those in the S&P Agreement. Letter from Michael Kantor, U.S. Trade Representative, to Henry A.Waxman, Chairman, House Committee on
Energy and Commerce (Sept. 7, 1993) (on file with the Office of the United States
Trade Representative).
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result in discrimination or a disguised restriction on international

trade."54 The meaning of this language is not immediately apparent, but
on its face it could provide a ground for a more searching scrutiny of a

party's S&P provisions than any of the other three requirements thus far
discussed. We should note, however, that the "arbitrary distinctions" language is tied to the proviso "if such distinctions result in discrimination or

a disguised restriction on international trade." 55 That proviso helps to
clarify the kind of case envisioned. A good example is the well known

German Beer case in EU law decided by the European Court ofJustice in
5

1987. 6
In the German Beer case, Germany allowed beer to be sold in Germany and labeled "bier" only if it was made from malted barley, hops,
yeast, and water. No additives at all were allowed. Most German beer has
been made in this manner since the sixteenth century. Beer in other EU

countries, however, is frequently made from rice and other cereals. In the
case of these beers, additives are needed for technical reasons to produce
the beer. The German rule therefore prevented much of the beer made

in other EU countries from being imported and sold in Germany as "bier."
Germany tried tojustify the rule in part on the ground that Germans consume large quantities of beer and that the additives in general would pose

a human health risk. The European Court of Justice rejected this argument, however, for one very striking reason: for all beverages, other than beer,
German law specifically allowed some of the very additives that were banned completely in beer. Thus, the arbitrariness of these distinctions appeared to convince the ECJ that the German regulation was essentially a form of
disguised protectionism designed to protect German beer producers from
non-German competitors.
Suppose, for example, that the toxicity of pesticides Y and Z are indistinguishable. Suppose further that the United States adopts a rule calling
for zero pesticide Z residue on apples. The U.S. provision might run into
trouble if, for example, pesticide Z were traditionally used in Canada, pesticide Y in the United States, and the zero pesticide residue rule applied
only to pesticide Z.
Admittedly, judgments could differ about the application of this "arbitrary distinctions" standard. But in its defense, how else could one deal
with a situation such as that presented by the German Beer case, apparently a case of disguised protectionism? There is a risk of an inappropriate
panel decision under the standard. Without it, however, there would be a
loophole through which very large amounts of disguised protection could
be driven.
5. Based on InternationalStandards (Harmonization)
Members must "base their sanitary or phytosanitary measures on interna54. S&P Agreemen4 supra note 5, para. 20.

55. I&
56. Case 178/84, Commission v. Germany, 1987 E.C.R. 1227, 1 C.M.L.R. 780

(1988).
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tional standards, guidelines or recommendations, where they exist. ... "57
There is, however, an express exception to this rule. A member is free to
set unilaterally a high level of risk protection, and it may depart from an
58
international standard if necessary to achieve its desired protection level.
The agreement thus contains only a weak effort to harmonize S&P
standards. Harmonization of standards of course can improve consumer
welfare significantly by removing the trade-clogging effects of a plethora of
inconsistent world-wide standards. Yet at the same time, harmonization
may have a tendency toward installing the least common denominator of
protection. The agreement therefore privileges the party seeking higher
health protection, so long as the higher level is a genuine S&P measure
and is not disguised protection of producers. Drawing the line between a
genuine S&P measure and disguised protection is left to the other disciplines of the agreement-essentially the four requirements discussed
above.5 9
Paragraph 10 of the agreement nudges the parties in the direction of
using international standards by providing that any S&P measure based on
an international standard is "deemed to be necessary... and presumed to
be consistent with the relevant provisions of [the S&P Agreement]. "6° But
the exact significance of this "deeming" and "presuming" is not clear.
"Deeming" a certain fact presumably establishes it irrebuttably. Thus, giving the word "necessary" its natural meaning (that there is no other less
restrictive means to the same end), the "deemed necessary" language of
paragraph 10 seems to mean that the measure will be found irrebuttably
to meet the requirement in paragraph 21 that "measures are not more
trade restrictive than required to achieve their appropriate level of protection .... -"61 If a member uses an international standard, no one can claim
that the measure is more trade restrictive than necessary or "required" to
achieve the "appropriate level of protection."
The presumption that a measure which conforms to an international
standard meets all other requirements of the S&P Agreement is curious.
The burden of proof issue is discussed more thoroughly below, 6 2 but, as
noted earlier, the burden of proof is normally borne by the complaining
member-state. Hence, one would have thought that a respondent state
always starts with a presumption that its measure is in compliance with all
requirements. If this analysis is correct, the agreement gives only a slight
nudge, or incentive, to members to use international standards-the
"deemed necessary" provision. The major thrust of the harmonization
obligation is thus hortatory.
So, coming back to our basic hypothetical, even if the international
standard called for allowing some pesticide Z residues on apples, the
57. S&P Agreement, supranote 5, para. 9.

58. Id. para. 11.
59. See supra notes 41-57 and accompanying text.

60. S&P Agreement supranote 5, para. 10.
61. Id. para. 21.
62. See infra part II.B.
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United States would still be free to insist on a higher level of health protection-namely zero risk and zero residue. In such a case the United States
would merely lose the "deeming" function of paragraph 10. It could
therefore be forced to respond to a claim that the measure in question was
more trade restrictive than necessary or required.
6. An Incremental Cost-Benefit Balancing Test
A sixth discipline-an incremental cost-benefit balancing test-could conceivably be found in the S&P Agreement. Nothing in the agreement explicitly imposes such a discipline. Nevertheless, parts of the agreement are
open to such a construction. This is perhaps the aspect of the S&P Agreement that most threatens a member's freedom to pursue its own level of
environmental protection. A cost-benefit balancing test could possibly be
inferred from the provisions of paragraphs 6 and 7 of the S&P Agreement.
a.

Paragraph 6: The "Applied-Only-To-The-Extent-Necessary" Standard

Paragraph 6 of the S&P agreement states that "[in]embers shall ensure
that any sanitary or phytosanitary measure is applied only to the extent
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health ....-6 This
language could be given at least three different readings. First, one could
emphasize the word "applied" and reason that the provision says nothing
about the substantive level or trade restrictiveness of S&P measures but
merely addresses the manner in which an existing measure is applied.
Thus, to use an example put forward by the U.S. Trade Representative's
Office, the provision would prevent a country from imposing a two-year
64
quarantine of imported cattle when a two-week period would suffice.
The Trade Representative's Office used this example to stress that NAFTA
language identical to that in paragraph 6 was intended to discipline how a
65
measure is applied rather than its substantive content.
Of course, emphasizing the word "applied" may be more question
begging than helpful. All standards must be applied, and if an unreasonable discipline attaches to the "application" rather than to the "creation"
stage of a standard, the result is still unreasonable interference with a
member's freedom to control its environment. But if the emphasis on
"applied" is combined with a second possible reading of the paragraph 6
language, the result should be noncontroversial.
The second reading of paragraph 6 would give the word "necessary"
its most ordinary or literal meaning: that an S&P measure should not
cause more trade restriction than necessary to achieve the desired level of
protection of human, animal, or plant life. In other words, if a member's
63. S&P Agreemen, supra note 5, para. 6.
64. Letter from Michael Kantor to Waxman, supra note 53.
65. See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32

I.L.M. 296 and 32 I.L.M. 605 [hereinafter NAFTA]; Letter from Michael Kantor to Waxman, supra note 53; Letter from Michael Kantor, U.S. Trade Representative, to John
Adams, Executive Director, Natural Resources Defense Council (Sept. 13, 1993) (on
file with the Office of the United States Trade Representative).
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appropriate level of protection could be achieved by two measures-A,
which would restrict trade by ten percent, and B, which would restrict
trade by fifty percent-only the less restrictive measure A would be permitted. At least one previous GATT panel decision has in fact construed the
XX to mean the "not-more-trade-restricterm "necessary" in GAIT article
66
tive-than-required" standard.
There are two possible objections to this second reading of paragraph
6. First, it could be argued that this interpretation renders superfluous
the paragraph 21 requirement that "[S&P measures] are not more trade
restrictive than required to achieve [a member's appropriate level of protection]."67 Second, in interpreting NAFTA article 712 (5), a provision virtually identical to paragraph 6, the U.S. Trade Representative expressly
claimed that the article does not impose a "least-trade-restrictive"
68
requirement
Both of these objections can be overcome, however, by combining the
first and second constructions, thereby interpreting paragraph 6 to
require that a member not apply a measure so as to cause more trade restriction than necessary for the appropriate level of protection desired. This
reading, of course, exactly tracks the U.S. Trade Representative's hypothetical quarantine case. 69 A measure aimed at protecting domestic cattle
from disease should not be used to quarantine imported cattle for two
years when several days would suffice. This approach has considerable
appeal-it gives meaning to the word "applied," gives a natural reading to
the word "necessary," and does not overlap with paragraph 21.70
Paragraph 6 also lends itself to a third construction. The language
"only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health" could be interpreted to imply a means-ends balancing test in
which a measure's contribution to protecting human, animal, or plant life
would be weighed against its cost in decreased trade. Even if the balance
were set very much in favor of any improvement in S&P protection, however slight, presumably there would be some level of trade loss that would
66. The panel construed the word "necessary" with reference to GATT article
XX(d) concerning a measure "necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations
which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement...." See United States
Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, GATT Doc. DS23/R, para. 5.52 (Feb. 2,
1992), reprinted in 4 WoRLD TRADE MATEUA.S 25, 113 (1992).

67. S&PAgreemen4 supra note 5, para. 21.
68. Article 712(5) of NAIFTA provides: "Each Party shall ensure that any sanitary or
phytosanitary measure that it adopts, maintains or applies is applied only to the extent
necessary to achieve its appropriate level of protection .... " NAFTA, supranote 65, art.
712(5).
69. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
70. Note that paragraph 5 of the S&P Agreement provides: "Members have the right
to take sanitary and phytosanitary measures necessary for the protection of human,
animal or plant life or health .... " S&P Agreement supra note 5, para. 5 (emphasis
added). This provision does not contain the word "applied." But it is phrased as a
right, not an obligation, and thus does not seem to impose any new obligations or
"disciplines." In any event, the "necessary" concept in paragraph 5 also seems best
interpreted to mean "least-trade- restrictive."
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outweigh the environmental benefits and defeat the measure. This can be
called the incremental cost-benefit balancing test version of paragraph 6.
Richard Stewart claims that language in the draft version of the Uruguay Round agreement very similar to the paragraph 6 "necessary" provision "invites" this third reading.7 1 Ford Runge, in discussing the
"necessary" language in GAIT article XX(b), language similar to that in
paragraph 6, quotes Robert Hudec as arguing that the concept of "necessary" implies an incremental cost-benefit balancing test: "[W]hether a
burdensome regulation is 'necessary' to achieve a domestic environmental
or health and safety objective 'is really an interlocking decision about
whether, as compared with the next least restrictive alternative, the extra
72
burden is worth the extra gain.'"
Daniel Esty, also discussing the "necessary" concept in GATI"article
XX, argues for a more moderate cost-benefit test but still accepts a balancing test as inherent in the "necessary" concept: "Thus the pivotal word
'necessary' should be reinterpreted to mean 'not clearly disproportionate
in relation to the putative environmental benefits and in light of equally
73
effective policy alternatives that are reasonably available."'
While these arguments are certainly worthy of consideration, I remain
convinced that a construction combining the first and second readings is
preferable for the reasons discussed above. That approach is also supported in part by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, the govern74
ment agency that negotiated the S&P Agreement for the United States.
71. See Richard Stewart, The NAFTA: Trade, Competition, Environmental Protection,27
INT'L LAw. 751, 760 n.29 (1993). The language that Stewart quotes is as follows: "[The

standards] shall not be more restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective."
Id. (quoting GATT, Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of the
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, GATT Doc. MTN/TNC/W/FA Dec. 20, 1991, § 6,
Standards Code, art. 2.2). Perhaps it is significant that this language does not contain
the word "applied" and actually seems to track most closely the "least-trade-restrictive"
provision of paragraph 21.
72. C. FoRD RUNGE, FREE TRADE, PROTaECrED ENViRONMENT 18 n.12 (1994) (citing a
personal communication from Robert Hudec discussing GATT article XX). GAT article XX(b) provides a general exception to GAT obligations using language very close
to that of paragraph 6 of the S&P Agreement: "[N]othing in this Agreement shall be
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures... necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health...." GATT, supra
note 7, art. XX.
The preamble to the S&P Agreement in fact explains that the Agreement is intended
to be an elaboration of the provisions of GAIT article XX(b). S&P Agreement, supra
note 5, pmbl.
73. Esiy, supra note 2, at 222.
74. The support from the U.S. Trade Representative's office is only partial because
the letter from Kantor to Adams, supranote 65, denies that the paragraph 6 languageat least as used in NAFTA-imposes a "least-trade-restrictive" requirement. Note, however, that the quarantine example used by Kantor in his letter to Waxman, supra note
53 and text accompanying note 64, seems to contradict Kantor's position in his letter to
Adams. The quarantine example in the Waxman letter made the point that cattle
should not be quarantined for two years when a quarantine of several days would be just
as effective. Thus, the example seems to follow a least-trade-restrictive rationale-albeit
in the context of "applying" a measure.
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Paragraph 7: The "Arbitrary-Discrimination-Or-DisguisedRestriction" Standard

Even if the "necessary" language of paragraph 6 were not read to introduce a cost-benefit balancing test, the provision in paragraph 7 might
yield that result. Paragraph 7 states:
Members shall ensure that their sanitary and phytosanitary measures do not
arbitrarilyor unjustifiably discriminate between Members where identical or similar
conditionsprevai4 including between their own territory and other Members.
Sanitary and phytosanitary measures shall not be applied in a manner which
would constitute a disguised restriction on internationaltrade.75
This language comes directly from the "head" or "chapeau" provision in
GAlT article XX, the general exceptions article: "[Measures authorized by
the article shall not be] applied in a manner which would constitute a
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the
same conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on internationaltrade ... -"76
Paragraph 7's link to an incremental cost-benefit test is indirect, but it
is not trivial. The article XX language just quoted was the model for both
paragraph 7 and for the last sentence of article 36 of the EU treaty.7 7 EU
article 36 excludes certain measures from the EU article 30 ban on any
measure equivalent to a quantitative restriction. Member-state product
standards are considered quantitative restrictions and fall within the EU
article 30 prohibition. 78 EU article 36 excludes from the ban, however,
those product standards based on various public purposes, including "the
protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants .... -79 The last
sentence of EU article 36 then adds that "such prohibitions or restrictions
[inherent in product standards] shall not, however, constitute a means of
arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member
States."8 0
It is precisely this language, the last sentence of article 36, that the
ECJ has relied upon in finding a cost-benefit balancing test-called the
"principle of proportionality"-in article 36:81
[I]n its [previous] judgments ... the Court inferred from the principle of
proportionalityunderlying the last sentence of Article 36 of the Treaty that prohibitions on the marketing of products containing additives authorized in the
Member State of production but prohibited in the Member State of importo what is actually necessary to secure the protectation must be restricted
82
tion of public health.
As part of this proportionality principle, the ECJ includes a "least-trade75. S&P Agreemet supra note 5, para. 7 (emphasis added).
76. GATr, supra note 7, art. XX (emphasis added).
77. See Ouvms, supra note 17, at 168.
78. EU Tnzxry, supra note 12, art. 30.

79. Id. art. 36.
80. Id. (emphasis added).
81. See GoRMLE, supra note 18, at 210.
82. Case 178/84, Commission v. Germany, 1987 E.C.R. 1227, para. 44, 1 C.M.L.R.
780, para. 44 (1988).

Cornell InternationalLaw Journal

Vol. 27

restrictive" test,83 but it also goes further in some cases to embrace an
explicit benefit-cost balancing test.
The well-known DanishBottles case 8 4 is one of the clearest examples of
cost-benefit balancing in EU proportionality decisions. In Danish Bottles,
Denmark required manufacturers to market beer and soft drinks in Denmark only in reusable containers matching one of the thirty specific
container types approved by the Danish government. Denmark explained
that authorizing more than thirty container types would interfere with the
willingness of retailers to cooperate in the deposit and return system
because of increased handling costs and the need for more storage space.
Danish law granted an exception to this basic regulation and allowed foreign producers to use non-approved containers but limited the exception
to market-testing quantities not exceeding 3000 hectoliters per year per
producer, provided that a deposit-and-return system were established for
the non-approved containers. The ECJ upheld the basic Danish requirement that all beer and soft drink containers be sold in reusable containers
subject to a deposit-and-return scheme, even though it acknowledged that
the scheme would disadvantage foreign producers disproportionately
because they would lose scale advantages in adjusting to the Danish
requirements and would face greater compliance costs by virtue of being
more distant foreign producers.
At the same time-and this is the most important aspect of the case
for our purposes-the ECJ struck down the quantity limitation on the use
of unauthorized containers. The Court concluded that the Danish restrictions on unauthorized containers were just too damaging to trade in comparison to the slight improvement in container recycling they would bring:
It is undoubtedly true that the existing system for returning approved containers ensures a maximum rate of re-use and therefore a very considerable
degree of protection of the environment since empty containers can be
returned to any retailer of beverages. Non-approved containers, on the
other hand, can be returned only to the retailer who sold the beverages,
since it is impossible to set up such a comprehensive system for those containers as well.
Nevertheless, the system for returning non-approved containers is capable
of protecting the environment and, as far as imports are concerned, affects
only limited quantities of beverages compared with the quantity of beverages consumed in Denmark owing to the restrictive effect which the

requirement that containers should be returnable has on imports. In those
circumstances, a restriction of the quantity of products
which may be marketed by
85
importers is disproportionateto the objective pursued
83. See, e.g., Case 124/81, Commission v. United Kingdom, 1983 E.C.R. 203, 2
C.M.LR. 1 (1983) (UK system requiring all UHT milk to be imported into the United
Kingdom solely by licensed operators, who in effect were required to repackage the
milk in the United Kingdom, was disproportionate because there was a less burdensome means of assuring that the imported milk was safe).
84. Case 302/86, Commission v. Denmark, 1988 E.C.R. 4607, 1 C.M.L.1R 619
(1989).
85. Id. at 4632 (emphasis added).
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From an American perspective, this rationale is similar to the balancing
approach the U.S. Supreme Court has followed in passing on state regulation of interstate commerce.8 6 Thus, one might conclude that a balancing
approach is in the end the only truly workable solution to the dilemma of
trying to accommodate two conflicting values-the freedom of each state
to pursue its own legitimate public purpose regulatory goals and the freedom of commerce to flow unfettered among the member-states. Nevertheless, I do not think GATT panels interpreting the S&P agreement
should feel entitled to adopt a similar incremental cost-benefit balancing
87
test in passing judgment on member S&P measures.
I believe the S&P provisions must be much more explicit about
authorizing a balancing test before GATr panels should venture into this
kind of decision-making. 8 8 GATT panelists are generally government officials expert in trade negotiations-they are not distinguished or revered
jurists or judges. Hence GATT panel decisions interpreting the Uruguay
Round Agreements will not benefit from the expertise and authority, or
receive the deference, that normally accompanies decisions of the ECJ or
the U.S. Supreme Court. Aggressive or imaginative adjudicating, at least
during the early stages of implementing and interpreting the new Uruguay Round agreements, is likely to cause the GATT? panel procedure to
lose rather than gain acceptance and prestige.
Of course it is true that the Uruguay Round agreements establish a
new World Trade Organization (WTO) with a dispute settlement proce86. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970), is most often cited as the leading authority for a balancing test in "dormant" commerce clause cases. For a more
recent example of this approach, see Northwest Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp.
Comm'n of Kan., 489 U.S. 493 (1989).
87. For a similar conclusion in a more general analysis of technical barriers to
trade, see SYms, supra note 33, at 17.
88. The legislative history of the TBT Agreement offers an example of a provision
that clearly would have authorized the incremental cost-benefit balancing test. The
1991 version of the TBT Agreement provided in article 2.2: "[T]echnical regulations
shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective, taking
account of the risks non-fulfillment would create." TBT Agreement, supranote 6, para.
2.2.
A footnote at the end of this sentence provides: "This provision is intended to ensure
proportionalitybetween regulations and the risks non-fulfillment of legitimate objectives
would create." 3 THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992) 527
(Terence P. Stewart ed., 1993) (emphasis added).
That footnote would surely have introduced incremental cost-benefit balancing into
the TBT Agreement. See Emst-Ulrich Petersmann, InternationalCompetition Rules for the
GATT-MTO World Trade and Legal System, 27J. WoRLD TRADE 35, 45 (1993). The footnote was omitted, however, in the final version of the agreement. TBTAgreemen4 supra
note 6, para. 2.2.
Omission of the footnote appears to mean that the parties did not intend to include
an incremental cost-benefit balancing test and hence that the term "necessary" retained
in the final version of article 2.2 should not be interpreted as authorizing such a balancing test. These points were confirmed to the author in a phone conversation with a
U.S. Trade Representative negotiator. This analysis indirectly supports the argument in
the text accompanying notes 63-72 that the "necessary" language in paragraph 6 of the
S&P Agreement also should not be interpreted as authorizing a cost-benefit balancing
test in the S&P Agreement.
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dure under which panel decisions will be binding,8 9 adding stature to the
role of the panelists. The procedure will also include appellate review of
legal questions by a Standing Appellate Body. 90 Thus, it will be the decisions of the Standing Appellate Body that will be the final word on interpreting the Uruguay Round Agreements. Moreover, members of the
Appellate Body will be required to have "demonstrated expertise in law," 9 1
which is not currently required of panelists. 92 Still, the Appellate Body is
not likely to carry the prestige or command the authority of the ECJ or the
U.S. Supreme Court at any point in the foreseeable future.
In any event, I believe environmentalists have a solid foundation for
opposing any interpretation of the S&P Agreement that authorizes GATT
panels to employ an incremental cost-benefit balancing methodology.
This represents probably the greatest threat to a member's freedom to
pursue its own level of environmental protection. There is considerable
evidence in the operative provisions themselves-and in the aspirational
provisions of the preamble to the S&P Agreement-that the parties
intended such member freedom. 93
B.

Burden of Proof

As stated earlier, 94 the paragraph 10 provision that a measure in conformity with international standards is "presumed to be consistent with the relevant provisions of [the S&P Agreement]" is puzzling. One might infer that
without the presumption the burden of proving a measure's conformity
with S&P Agreement requirements rests on the member employing the
measure. It is unclear, however, from what source such a burden of proof
assignment could arise. It is certainly contrary to the normal procedural
rule in most legal systems that puts the burden of proof on the challenging party and not on the respondent.
Where a member has been forced to rely on the general exceptions of
GATr article XX to justify a trade measure, GATT practice has indeed
been to place the burden ofjustification on the member claiming the benefit of the article XX exception.9 5 But as noted at the outset of this
paper,96 as long as a member applies a measure non-discriminatorily, it
89. See generally, GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and Trade-MultilateralTrade Neotiations
(The UruguayRound): Understandingon Rules and ProceduresGoverning the Settlement of Disputes, Doc. MTN/FA, Part Il, Annex 11 (Dec. 15,1993), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 112 (1994);
id. para. 16.4.
90. Id. art. 17.

91. Id. para. 17.3.
92. See id. para. 8.1.
93. The preamble, for example, states: "Desiringto further the use of harmonized
sanitary and phytosanitary measures between Members.... without requiringMembers to
change their appropriatelevel ofprotection of human, animalor plant life or health...." S&P
Agreemen supra note 5, pmbl. (emphasis added).

94. See supranotes 60.61 and accompanying text.
95. See United States Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, GATT Doc. DS23/
R, (Feb. 7, 1992), para. 5.41, reprinted in 4 WoRLD TRADE MATERasS 25, 107 (Sept.
1992).

96. See supra text accompanying notes 19-25.
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acts consistent with GATT and has no need to resort to the general exceptions of article XX. The S&P Agreement imposes additional obligations
upon countries that adhere to it, but nothing in the agreement provides
that parties as a general matter are burdened with a presumption against
compliance. the agreement therefore introduces confusion about which
party holds the burden of proof.
In the absence of further clarification, I would assume that the presumption in paragraph 10 was not meant to shift the burden of proof from
the respondent (where it never rested in the first place) to the complainant, but rather to require the complainant to meet a higher level of proof
than ordinary. Thus, a member would be encouraged to use an international standard, because the "presumption" attaching to such use would
impose something like a "clear and convincing evidence" burden on any
member complaining against the use of that standard.
C.

Dispute Settlement

The new dispute settlement procedure introduced by the Uruguay Round
has been described earlier in this article.9 7 The new binding force of
panel decisions will be celebrated by those who want to see the GATT
system taken more seriously, but it will likely be a cause of concern for
environmentalists worried that GATT rules threaten environmental welfare. Yet, even if this article's conclusions are incorrect and the new Uruguay Round agreements prove to be more intrusive than I have argued
they seem to be or should be, there is still an ultimate safeguard for
national autonomy.
The binding quality of GATT panel decisions under the Uruguay
Round provisions means only that the panel result will establish the meaning of the GATT provisions in dispute. The GATT has no right or power
to require a change in a member-state's internal law. Members have not
even undertaken a formal obligation to bring their internal law into consistency with GATT panel decisions. A member can in good faith refuse to
conform its internal law if it is willing either to compensate the complaining party or parties with other trade concessions or to suffer retaliation against its own exports. Of course, these consequences in a given case
could be onerous and will surely exert considerable pressure on a member
to amend its national law. It is nevertheless significant that through unilateral decision a member-state may choose to retain any of its environmental standards.
Conclusion
This article has tried to show that the original 1947 GATT was especially
benign in its effect on members' freedom to regulate their own environments. The new Uruguay Round S&P and TBT Agreements will usher in
important new commitments that go beyond the basic non-discrimination
97. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
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obligation of the original GATT. Nevertheless, this detailed look at the
S&P Agreement supports the conclusion that its disciplines should pose
no real threat to genuine environmental standards for product-caused
pollution.
While any supranational regime, such as the GATT, constrains to
some extent the autonomy of contracting parties in areas regulated by the
regime, the disciplines in the S&P Agreement seem relatively mild and
reasonable. That is not to say that there are no areas of the new GATE
regime that merit continued scrutiny or that may require adjustments in
the future. Experience under the new Uruguay Round regime may well
expose areas of weakness that need attention. This article has discussed
two such areas: the provisions on burden of proof and, more importantly,
the provisions that might induce a future panel to read into the agreement an incremental cost-benefit balancing regime. This paper has
argued against such a balancing test-it is not explicitly provided for in
the agreement and would give unwarranted discretion to GATT panels.
The balancing test aside, the S&P Agreement appears to be an admirable
effort at curtailing de facto and disguised protectionism in product standards while retaining a member's basic freedom to fix its own level of
internal environmental protection.

